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A b s t r a c t
We investigate  the implications for  the setting of interest rates when
monetary policy decisions are taken by a  committee, in which a  subset
of members may  meet prior to  the voting in the committee and  therefore
bas the possibility  to reach  consensus ex ante to vete  unanimously  ex
post. We allow for  different committee sizes,  various  voting rules and
differences  in skills  among committee members. We find that the size
of the committee is much  less important in determining  the  degree of
interest rate  inertia  than the skills  of committee members. Moreover,
prior interaction of a  subgroup  only bas a minor effect on the setting of
interest rates by the committee, provided that members on average  are
equally  skilled and  voting takes place using a  simple  majority rule. If
either of these  assumptions  are relaxed, prior interaction bas substantial
effect6  on the setting of interest rates.
JEL  codes: E52, E58
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1 Introduction
Most textbooks on monetary policy are based,  either implicitly OI  explicitly,
on the assumption  that policy decisions are taken  by a homogenous  entity,
often  denoted by ‘the’ central  bank. However,  in reality these decisions are
the competente  of a group  of persons,  organized  in the farm  of a committee.
Prominent examples  include  the Federal  Open Market  Committee  (FOMC) of
the Federal  Reserve System and the Governing  Camcil  of the European  Centra1
Bank (ECB). As noted  by, inter  aha,  Blinder (1998),  the fact  that monetary
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decision-making is conducted by a committee could have implications for the
way  policy is conducted. One could, for example, argue that committees  tend
to be inertial, as  they tend to  adept compromise positions.
In addition,  members of monetary policy committees  are often chosen  to
ensure  a braad representation of society. This set-up is often imbedded in a
central bank structure characterized  by a main office in a central location, with
additional  regional  offices  throughout the currency area. The US, where the
Federal Reserve Act requires  al1 of the monetary policy-makers to have some
regional identity (sec  Meade and Sheets  (2002)) again  is a good example of such
a hub-snd-spoken-system.  As a consequente, the FOMC consists of the members
of the Board of Governors  (hub) as  wel1  BS  the presidents  of the Federal Reserve
Banks  (spokes). The Governing  Council  of the ECB includea  members of the
Execotive Board of the ECB (hub) as wel1  as  governors  of al1 euro  area national
central banks  (spokes).
This paper investigates the implications for the setting of interest rates  when
decisions  are taken by & ‘huband-spokes’  committee. Oor main contribution  to
the literature is that we allow  for a subset  of members (the ‘hub’)  to meet prior to
the voting. This interaction  may modify their behavior  dwing the actual  voting
in the committee: they may for example ex ante decide  to  take an unanimous
stand.’ We investigate  this issue in the second  section,  under the assumption
of a simple  majority voting rule.  Section  3 extends this analysis  to the case
in which there exists an asymmetry  in decisional  skills  of committee members,
i.e. they differ in the degree  of accuracy in assesaing  the state of the economy,
between  the ‘hub’ and the ‘spokes’. This asymmetry  may (but need  not) be
related to  an informational  asymmetry. One could think of a situation  in which
the center produces, and disseminates only  with  some time  lag, some statistical
information, which is an  important input in monetary policy diicussions.  In
sections 4 and 5 we take up the issue of alternative voting  rules,  i.e. unanimity
and the optimal rule,  that is the one which  maximizes  the degree  of accuracy of
the collective  decision-making process.
Our results  indicate that the possibility of prior interaction of a subgroup  bas
a marginal  effect on the interest rate set by the committee, provided  members
are on average equally  skilled  and committee decisions  are taken by simple
majority. Ski11  differentials and/or  unanimity voting  tule,  however,  imply that
prior interaction bas  a substantial  effect.
2 The voting game
We investigate  incomplete-information voting  outcomes in a committee of indi-
vidu&, in which  a group  of members (‘the Board’) bas  the possibility to reach
consensus ex ante and therefore may vete unanimously  ex post. The Commit-
tee meets in order to decide  whether interest rates should be changed  (decision
‘In reality  unanimous  voting  by a subset  of the committee is  rather  common  in monetary
policy decision-making, sec  Gildea  (1992). Whether  this is the  result  of ex  ante co-ordinatmn
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A) or not (decision B). The Committee members i = 1,X.x are nat certain
what is the true state of the world or, in other words,  whether economie condi-
tions  require a change of policy interest rates (state A) or not (state B). The
decision-taking  procedure is BS  fellows:
1. The states of the world are not necessary  equally likely. The probability
that a state of the world occurs  which requires  a change in interest rates
is Q (henceforth called  the ‘prior’) and the probability that the state is
such  that rates  should be kept constant is 1 -  Q:
J’(A) = Q
P ( B )  = l - Q
These probabilitias  farm a benchmark, as  they represent the ‘correct’ leve1
of monetary policy activism (Q) or inertia (1 - Q).
2. Committee members take monetary policy decisions by voting.*  Each  in-
dividual member  bas  two  choicea:  vete in favor of a change in the policy
rate (vote  A) or vete against  a change in the policy rate (vote  B). The
latter  is, in our  set-up, identical to a vete in favor of keeping the policy
rate unchanged. The decision of the individual Committee member  is con-
ditional  on imperfect information about the truc and unobservable  state
of the world. Committee members possen private knowledge  of current
economie conditions (i.e. economie data becoming available  after briefing
by their stal?, private conclwions  drawn based  on some (possibly  common)
information, etc.), which differs in the degree  of accuracy. Therefore  the
ability of asseasing  the current state of the world correctly is heterogenous
among Committee members, i.e.  the probability of supporting the change
of interest rates in state A (opposing the change in state B) is individual:
P,(vote AIA) =  P,(vote BIB) =  q, E (0,l)
P,(vote BIA) =  P,(vote AIB) =  1  - 4,
We aasurne  that individual decisional  skills  of Committee members repre-
sent independent draws  from a single distribution with E (qi)  = qc. The
latter  may be also  interpreted as  assuming that Committee members on
average are equally skilled. This may be due to the fact  that expertise
often is an important selection criterion for membership. The Maastricht
Treaty, for example,  in this respect mentions “recognized  standing and
professional experience in monetary or banking  matters” (Article 11).
3. m out  of n members (the Board) meet prior to voting  in the Committee
and exchange their views  on economie conditions.  Thii meeting may reault
2We  assume  that the Committee 88  wel1  as  the Board decide  only on monetary policy. In
wìdition, w  preclude  any  intertemporal  correlation  of monetsry  policy outccnnes.  That is, we
only mnsider one-shot  games. hrrthermore,  as  our  focus is on decisional  MIS  of Committee
members, we preclude  any  strategie  behavior.
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in three outcomes: (1) if ke out  of m Board members are in favor of a
change in interest rates, the Board wil1  vete unanimously for a change
in interest rates in the upcoming meeting of the Committee (situation
C(A)), (2) if kg  out  of m Board members are against a change in interest
rates, the Board decides  to vete unanimously against  the change (situation
C(B)), (3) otherwise  the Board does not assume any  common position and
al1 Board members wil1  vete individually in the Committee (situation 1).3
4. al1 n members of the Committee vete. Interest rates are kept unchanged
if at least k members vete against  (they vete B).4
2 . 1 Position of the Board
If the Board bas  the posaibility  to interact  prior to the Committee meeting,
the Board members wil1  vote on their position regarding interest rates  the same
way  as the Committee vetes  afterwards on the change of interest rates. There
is, however,  an  important differente in that the Board - in contrast to the
Committee, can decide ‘not to decide’, as the formal  decision on interest rates
is taken only  in the Committee. The Board meeting thus  can generate three
outcomes, and the decision rule that we propose  translates  binary  individual
choices into three possible  collective  decisions. The Board members may decide
to collectively  vete in favor of the status quo (C(B)) or in favor of a change
(C(A)) in the upcoming Committee meeting, if a certain majority of the Board%
members is in favor of either alternative. Otherwise,  Board members wil1  vete
individually in the Committee meeting (I).’  In al1 cases, the correaponding
probabilities depend on the likelihood  of the state of the world  occurring (i.e.
the prior) and decisional  skills of the Board members:
P(C(A))  =  Q  c nqzn(l-qs,+(l-Q>  c fl(l-qdnqa  (2)
:%t'- es " 'ES +s
P(I) = 1 --P(C) = 1  - P(C(B))  - P(C(Ai ( 3 )
where the sums  are taken over al1  subsets  S of the set of the Board members
M = {l, 2,3, . . ..m}. such  that s (the number of members in S) is at least  ks.
‘Let  U B  asaume  that m = 6 and ka = 5. If  theie  were 4 vota  for  A and 2 for  B. then  the
Board would  nat  reach  a  common  p&on  and  wauld  vote  individually subsequently.  If the
vota  were divided 5 to  1, then  the Board would  vote  unanimoualv for  A in the Committee
m e e t i n g .
‘In sections  2  and 3 we  wil1  consider  only the simple  majority  wting  rule.  Therefore
k =  ^  for  odd n. In section  4 we wil1  investhate the unanimitv  case:  k = n.1
JWith such  an  assumption about  the Boa&  decision rule  we want to  introduce  M  en-
downous  uossibilitv that  the Board dws nat  reach  anv  mier decision  land wtea  individu&
expo&).  It  turn;  out  that this  decision rule  is su&ior  to  the  ordinuy  aimple  major&
(which would  praelude  the ‘no.decision’  outcome)  in term8  of the accuracy  of tkc  Committee’a
decisions: sec  the appendix.
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Under the assumption that individual decisional skills of the Board members
represent independent draws  from a single distribution with E (q,,,tM)  = qs,
then average (expected) probabilities  of the Board taking either of the three
actions  are given  ~3.3:
EP(C(B)) = QsfB (J) Cl- qe)‘q;-’  + (1 - Q) *gB  ($k (1 - m)“@+J
EP(C(A)) = QagB  (;)(l  - qB)m-6&  + (1 - Q) #gD  (;)q;-’  (1 - q@J
EP(I) = 1 - EI’(C)  = 1 - [EP(C(B))  + EP(C(A))] (6)
Figwe 1 presents  graphically the expected probability that a 6member  Board
~ssumes  a common position in the Committee (i.e. collectively  supports either
a proposal  to change interest rates or to leave  them unchsnged), EP(C)  =
EP(C(B))+EP(C(A))6,  as a function of average decisional skills of its members
for two  limiting cases: the maximum threshold  (or  unanimity, ks = 6)’ and the
minimum threshold (kg = 4)‘:
!L 0 0.2 0.4 @)0,6 0.B I
Figure 1: Expected probability that the Board will  act unrmimously  in the
Committee voting
The Board is most likely to vete in tandem in the upcoming Committee
meeting if average decisional skills of its  members are either very  low  or very
high. However,  in the first case the Board is likely to agree on the less  probable
(‘wrong’) state of the world,  in the second  case on the more probable (‘right’)
ene. The explanation is as fellows:  as  qs approaches either of the bounds  the
Board members become  more uniform in their decisional skills (whether goed
OI  wrong) and  therefore are more likely to reach a common  position under all
possible circumstances  (i.e. in either of the states).
6Note  that,  a  this prabahility  does nat  distinguish  betten  chmging  interest rates  or  nat,
it  does  nat  depend  on the prior for  a  fixed  threshald  ks.
‘Thicker lim
8Thinner  lim
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Furthermore,  the expected probability of a consensual  outcome  varia  consid-
erably (between  0.03 and 1) under the unanimity rule and remains consistently
high if the threshold is 4 (between  0.69 and 1).
2.2 Voting in the Committee
If the Board does nat interact  prior to the Committee meeting, the decision-
taking  situation represents a standard voting game.9 The probabilities of pass-
ing the decision in favor of status quo (decision B) or in favor of a change in
interest rates (decision A) by the Committee under a simple  majority voting
rule,  conditio&  on the Board voting individually,  are:
P(decision  All) =  1  - P(decision  Bl1)
where N = {l, 2,3, . . . . n} is the set of al1  Committee members (i.e.  including
the members of the Board).
As in the previous  subsection, we can relate expected probabilities of pass-
ing either of the two  decisions in the Committee to average decisional skills of
Committee members, qc  = E(qi,tEN):
EP(decision Bl1) = Q#=k+  ( y) (1 - qc)“qz-”
n
+(l - Q)  &  (;)qk  Cl-  qc)‘- (9)
EP(decision AlI)  =  1  - EP(decision BI1) (10)
The interpretation of these probabilities is quite  intuitive. If the prior probe
bility indicates that the economie  situation more likely does (does nat)  require
a change in interest rates (Q > (<) 0.5),  then the average probability of leav-
ing status quo (decision B) is decreasing  (increasing)  in the average leve1  of
decisional skills, i.e. the Committee compwed  of better-informed  individu& is
more likely to agree on the appropriate action  than the Committee composed of
less-informed members. If both states of the world  are equally  likely (Q = 0.5),
then the expected probability that either decision  is taken is independent of the
Committee size  and average decisional  skills and is equal  to 50%.
Figuren  2 and 3 depict  graphicaIly  expected probabilities of interest rate
change (decision A) for Q = 0.25 and Q = 0.75 for different Committee siaes,
i.e. n = {9,19,29} .l”
%ee  e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks  (1996),  Ben-Yashar  and Nitzan (1997) or  Nitzan and
Paroush  (1985)
‘OThicker  line  indicates  higher  n.
6
Figure 2: Expected probability thst the Committee wil1  change interest rates
if Q = 0.25 (individual voting)
Figure 3: Expected probability that the Committee wil1  change interest rates
if Q = 0.75 (individual voting)
We start with  an explanation of the asymptotics. As 9~  approaches unity,
on average every  Committee member  is able  to assess  the economie conditions
correctly.  Therefore  the expected probability that the Committee wil1  take a
certain decision converges  to the prior probability that the state of the world
requires such  an action.  As QC  approaches zero, average decisional skills in
the Committee are so  low, that the Committee is increasingly  likely  to take a
decision that is at odds with the state of the world.
Fwthermore,  the likelihood  of a change in interest rates does not vary  sub-
stantially  with  the actual size  of the Committee. That is, increasing  the size  of
the Committee does nat necessarily  increase the degree  of interest rate inertia
or activism. However,  for given  average decisional skills, the speed of conver-
gence  to  the prior probability increases  with  the siw  of the Committee. In ether
words,  the size  of the Committee influences  the relevante of individual decisional
skills, in that this influence  diminishes with  the Committee size.
We now  turn to an  investigation  of the effects of the prior interaction of the
Board members  and the possibilzty  of the Board reaching  ccmsensus  prior to the
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Committee vete. We proceed in two stages. Fint,  we compute the probabilities
that interest rates wil1  or wil1  nat be changed  by the Committee, conditional
on the fact  the Board bas  decided on a unanimous position (that is P(decision
AIC) and P(decision  ElC)).  They are given  as fellows:
+ P(B)  P(C w PI 1if77Z>*
p(W) CdFgFfm IJes qs  Ikes (1 - q.) if nat
(11)
P(decision  AIC) = 1 - P(decision  SIC) (12)
where (by formulas  (1) and (2))
P(C(B)JA)  = P(C(A)IB)= 5 n<l-q,>flq,
” SE.9 ip.5
P(C(A)  = P(C(A)(A)+P(C(B)IA)=P(ClB)=P(C)
Obviously,  if the Board is langer  than the required siae  of & majority in the
Committee, i.e.  if m 2 9, then  the common position of the Board determines
the outcome of the Committee voting:
P(C  (Bl)P(decision  BlC)&+ = -
P(C)
p(C  (4)P(decision  AIC&,>+ = -
P(C)
Otherwise,  obtaining  the majority for status quo requires,  in the case of the
Board voting against  the status quo, that the required majority of 9 non-
Board members  are in favor of status quo or,  if the Board vota  in favor, that
8
-L
at least 2 - m non-Board members are in favor of status quo:
1
P(W(C  (4 IA)
P(decision  SjC’)l,<+ = po ( -
Cssy-+~  fltes (1 - 4 Ikes
+PW=(C (4 PI
( -
Cssc>~y-g  &s 91 IL,s (1 -
1 P(W’(C(B)  14 C SCN-M Ik,, 0  - qd  Il,,, qt
+po
i -,>v-Wl
+p(m(cw PI
( -
Cs~‘$-Mm  l-LES4!  IJ,,, Cl-
(15)
P(decision  Ajc)\,,,,+~ = 1 - P(decision  BlC)j,,+ (16)
We can now  compute the total probabilities of a change (decision A) OI no  change
(decision B) in interest rates, conditional  on the fact  that the Board members
interact  prior to the Committee vete and have the possibility  of reaching  con-
sensus. We therefore combine equations  (7)-(8)  and (11)~(12)  in the following
way:
P(decision  B) = P(I)P(decision  BlI) + P(C)P(decision  B ( C )  ( 1 7 )
P(decision  A )  =  1  - P(de&ion  B) (18)
These probabilities depend  on the size  of the Board, the size  of the Committee,
prior probabilities and decisional skills of al1 Committee members. Assuming
again  that decisional skills are independently distributed, we can express ex-
pected probabilities of either outcome as a function of average decisional skills
of the Board members and al1 Committee members:
EP(decision B) = EP(I)EP(decision  BlI) + EP(C)EP(decision  BIOS)
EP(decision A) = 1 - EP(decision B) (20)
where  the expected probability of deciding in favor of status quo, if the Board
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acts unanimously,  EP(decision SIC),  can be expressed as:
Figures 4 and 5 depict  graphically the expected likelihood  of the Committee
deciding on a change in interest rates, conditional  on the Board interacting
before the Committee meeting, i.e. EP(decision A), (solid  lines) end under
the assumption that the average of decisional  ski& is the same  for the Board
members and for t h e  whole  Commit tee ,  i.e.  qs = qc = q. Given  t h e  lage
number of parameters involved,  we present expected probabilities  for two  priors,
& = {0.25,0.75}“, and two  Committee sizes,  n = {9,29}“, m = 6 and ka = 4.
Dotted lines  refer to the case in which the Board bas  no  option to meet prior
to the interest rate voting  and can be traced back to figures  2 and 3.
) 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 p 0 . 6 0 8 I
Figure 4: Expected probability  that the Committee wil1  change interest rates
(Q = 0.25)
“For Q = 0 5 expected probabilities of taking  either  decision  are  equal,  i.e. EP(decision
B)  = EP(decision A) =  0.5, regardless  whether  the Board members do or  do nat  decide  ex
ante to  take an  unanimow  pasition ex post.
“Thicker  line  corresponds  to  larger  n.
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IFigure 5: Expected probability that the Committee wil1  change interest rates
(Q = 0.75)
It fellows  from these graphs that prior interaction of the Board members
hss  a minor effect on the average degree  of monetary  policy activism. Further
interpretation is similar to the conclusions presented earlier:  Committee’s size
does not seem to be very  relevant in determining the likelihood of a change
in interest rates. The skills of Committee members are very  relevant in this
context, as poer skills lead  to an  increased  likelihood that the Committee takes
a wrong decision.
3 Implications of skills’ asymmetry
In this section  we wil1  make the structure of the game more complex by assuming
that the average of decisional skills among Board members is higher  than the
average in the whole  Committee, i.e. ps > qc.‘s Figures 6 and 7 correspond  to
figwes 4 and 5 in the previous  subsection  and represent expected probabilitiss
of an  interest rate change  for 0~  = 0.8 as  a function of averaece  decisional skills
of the whole  Committee-qc  (6:  {0.25,0.75}14,  n = {9,29} ,%x = 6, ks = 4).‘s
%VMch  impliea  that  average  decisional skills among ether  Committee members (i.e. non-
Board members) are  very  low  (since  pc  =  Fqa  +  yq.~~).
“Wben  the prior is neutral,  i.e. Q =  0.5, the likelihood of a change in interest rates  is fìxed
a t  5 0 % .
lSDotted  Lines  again  refer  to  the case in which the Board dws nat  interact  prior to  the
voting  in the Committee.
1 1
Figure 6: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest rates
if Q = 0.25 (qc < 48)
Figure 7: Expected probability that the Committee will  change interest rata
if Q = 0.75 (qc < 48)
The fact  that Board members are (on average) more axurate  in their deci-
sions  modifies the conclusions  from the previous  section.  Whereas  we concluded
in the latter  that the possibility  of the Board reaching  conaenaus  apriori did not
have a major infiuence,  we now  sec  that a relatively  high expertise of the Board
members actually improves  the accuracy of the decision making process,  mes-
sured by the deviation  of the expected probability that the Committee tak.%  a
certain decision from the prior probability that such  an  action should  be taken.16
Especially  if the Committee is small, such  that the size  of the Board is
lager  than the required size  for Committee majority, the expected probability
of 8 . change in interest rates differs by (only) 0.05 from the truc probability Q,
even if average decisional skills  in the whole  Committee approach zero. Were
16This  result  holds for  any value of <IS > qc.  ff qc  = q~ = q < 0.2, the accuracy  of
decisions taken by the Committee would be very low: the expected probability of o change
in interest rates  would be close to 1 - Q (and  nat  Q). Fixing  tbe Board’s  average decisional
ski&  at 0.2 results  in the lowring  of the  degree  of znoccumey  in the Committee’s  decisians
by at most O.W8 (if n = 9) and 0 00004 (if n = 29).
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average decisional skills equal among al1 members of the Committee, a low leve1
of ski& would  induce  the Committee to actually change interest rates with the
frequency of 1  -Q (instead of Q). In a large  Committee, high decisional skills of
the Board improve monetary policy decision making as well: the average degree
of activism approaches the prior probability Q much quicker  thsn in the case of
equal skills (the differente is as  low  BS  0.08 even if the average accuracy among
al1 Committee members is 50% (i.e. if QC = 0.5)).
4 Consensual voting
In the previous  sections we imposed 8 simple  majority rule  for decision making in
the Committee (k  = 2). We now  turn to an investigation  of the consequences
of unanimity (k  = n) for the degree  of monetary  policy activism. We wil1  assume
that the default option is status quo and that interest rates are changed  only
if Committee members unauimously  vete against  the proposal  of keeping rates
unchanged. We start by essuming  (as in the second  section)  that Board and
Committee members are on average equally skilled,  i.e. <IB = QC  = 4. The
probabilities  of a change in interest rates (decision A) in the two  cases:  no  prior
interaction (case 1) and prior interaction (case 2) read as  fellows:
P’(decision  A) = Qnqa+<l-Q)n<l-9,)
SEN SN
(22)
The expected probabilitiea (computed under the essumptions m = 6 and ka =
4) *re  now  given  as:
EP’(decision A) = Qq”  + (1 - Q) (1 -9)” (24)
EPz(decis.ion  A) =  Q  ($ (z)q’ (1 - q16-‘)  qnm6
+u -Q) ($ (j)qR-*  (1 -ds)  (1 - 9Y (25)
Figuren  8, 9 aud 10 present expected probabilities  of a change in interest rates
under a unauimous voting rule  for three Committee sizes:  n = {9,19, 29)17  and
three priors: Q = {0.25,0.5,0.75).
“Thicker  lim  cmresponds  ta  larger  n.
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Figure 8:
(Q =0.25)  -
unanimity
Figure  9: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.5)
Figure 10 cpected  probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.75)
1
07
0.6
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01 0.4 q 06 0.8  I
:pected  probability of interest rate charme ander
The figuren  corroborate the largely  qualitative  statements made by Blinder
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099% as quoted  in the introduction. If the Committee favors consensus, the
degree of monetary  policy activism is close to zero. Only  at relatively  high leve1
of decisional skills Q does the probsbility of taking a certain decision converge
to the true probability Q. The convergente  to  the prior is furthermore  achieved
for much higher  decisional skills than in the case of simple majority.
We now  turn to an investigation  of the impact of prior interaction of the
Board members. Figure 11 presents relative  ezpected  pmbabilities of a change
in interest rates, i.e. the differences in expected probabilities between  the case
of prior interaction and no  interaction (i.e. EP’(decision A) - EP’(decision
A)), under an  unanimous voting rule.  The concept of the relative  probability
provides  simple means of seeing  whether, and by how  much, prior interaction by
the Board increases  or lowers  the degree of Committee’s activism, in comparison
to individual  voting.
We allow  for tvm  Committee sizes:  n = {9,29}‘s. Dotted linea  denote  the
case when  Q = 0.25, dsshed  lines  - Q = 0.5 and solid  lines  Q = 0.75.
1
0.2 0.4 q 0.6 0 8 I
Figure 11: Relative expected probability of interest rate change under
unanimity (qc = QB  = q)
Under the simple majority rule  a prior interaction by the Board members
hardly a&cted  the average likelihood  of a change in interest rates (at least if
we do nat Bssume  superior  skills among the members of the Board). Under the
consensual  voting rule,  however,  prior interaction incresses  the probability that
interest rates wil1  be change3  by up to 27%. This is because prior interaction
‘softe&  the rigidity inherent in the unanimous voting rule, i.e.  the requirement
that al1 members must be of the same  opinion. If the Board is allowed  to decide
on its common position  as described  in subsection  2.1, the actual  number of
Committee members which have to be in favor of a change in interest rates  is
ut - m + Lg,  and not n;  the remaining m - kB  members of the Board wiU vote
for a change against  their private opinion. The impact is larger, ceteris paribus,
the smaller the Committee: in a smal1  Committee the expected likelihood of a
change in interest rates is larger for all  values  of q; in a large  Committee thii
effect is limited to extreme average competente levels.
‘8Thicker  line  correaponds  to  langer  n.
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We now  relax the assumption of equal  average  voting skills by considering
the expected probability of interest rate change in the case of higher  skills among
Board members: QS > QC  (case 3):
Ep(decision  A) = Q (5 (t)& ( 1  - 9~)~~“) &’
a=4
+(l  - Q) (5 (f)&’ Cl- 4’)  Cl- qc)“-‘@)
r=4
In thii case, we confirm the earlier findings under the simple majority rule  (sec
figuren  6 and 7) that the effect of prior interaction are more profound. Figure 12
below presents  relative expected probabilities of a change in interest rates (i.e.
E@‘(decision  A) - EP’(decision A)) for 48  = 0.8 and n = {9,29} as a function
of average decisional skills in the Committee QC.  Dotted lines  denote  the case
when  Q = 0.25, dashed  linea  when  Q = 0.5 and solid  lines when  Q = 0.75.
J
Figure 12: Flelative  expected probability of interest rate change under
unanimity (qc  < qB = 0.8)
In the case  when  Committee members, which interact  prior to voting on
interest rata, have superior  decisional skills (qB  = 0.8),  the effect of the in-
teraction depends on the leve1  of skills of ether members and the size  of the
Committee. If the skills are low,  the interest rates are (on average) las  likely
to be changed  if interaction takes place.  If the skills are higher  (langer  than 0.4)
and the Committe  is smal1  (e.g. n = 9),  the effect is opposite: the interest
rates  are more likely to be changed. If the Committee was  large  (e.g. n = 29)
and the skills were higher  than 0.2, the Board’s  action would  have no  effect on
the interest rates (the relative probability is zero). This pattern  is largely  the
same  for al1  priors.
If the ‘superior’ decisional skilIs  of the Board were as  low as  0.2, prior inter-
action would  have roughly  ene effect: an increase  in the frequency of interest
rate change  (see figure  13 below).
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Figure 13: Relative  expected probability of interest rate change under
unanimity (qc < qB = 0.2)
5 Optimal voting rule
In the analysis  so  far, the Committee used  either a simple majority rule  or the
unanimity principle when  deciding on interest rates. The motivation for these
rules  is mainly their real-life applicability. The FOMC for example uses  a simple
majority rule,  whereas the Governing  Council  of the ECB - although  de jure
also  supposed  to we a simple majority rule  - de facto eets  interest rates besed
on the principle of consensw~‘~  Using either of these rules,  we investigate  the
consequences  for the degree  of interest rate activism or inertia. In this section,
we broaden the perspective  by turning to B rule  that is optimal in the sensc  that
it maximizes  the degrec  of accuracy of the collective  dccision-making  process.
Although we introduce the possibility  of prior interaction of Board members,
it hes no influence  on an ex ante defined voting rule (since  the game is simulta-
neous).  Therefore  standerd results  from the literature hold: the optimal voting
rule derived  by Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) for the casc  when  al1 Committce
members  vete individually  remains optimal here.  We therefore know  that the
optimal  rule need  nat be simple majority. The optimality of simple majority
requires streng assumptions:  (1) identical decisional  skills  among al1 members
of the Committee and (2) equal  prior probability of the sta&  of the world
occurring, i.e. Q = 0.5.
We wil1  proceed by examining the probabilitiee  of a change and no change in
interest rates onder the optimal voting rule.  As OUT  setup is fairly complex, we
wil1  retain the fint  assumption of equal  decisional  skills  among al1  Committee
members, i.e. for al1 i E  N
P,(vote AIA) =  P,(vote BIB) = q  E (0,l)
P,(vote BIA) =  P,(vote AIB) =  1  - q
lgThis  statement is  based  on public  eomments  by the  ECB  President dwing  hearings in the
European  Parliament  in April md  December 1999.
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In this case the optimal quota, i.e. K’  such  that the majority [nd1’“,  is
given  as:
(27)
The optimal quota is closest  to 50% (simple majority) only if decisional skills are
very  low  or very  high. It can  therefore be concluded  that, since  in practice the
voting rule  cannot change too frequently,  and it is likely  that Q wil1  nat always
equal  0.5, the best way  to make the simple majority both the optimal rule and
relatively  independent from Q, is to sim for high decisional skills of Committee
members. As Q approaches  0.5 the quota becomes infinite  (undelined).  In the
intermediate range of decisional skills Q E  (0.2,0.4) U (0.6,O.g)  the optimal quota
wuies  between 43% and 57%.*l  In the table below  we present the size  of the
optimal majority for the Committee of 19 members, for various  priors and ski11
levels.
In figures  16 and 17 we present the probability of a change in interest rate
under the optimal voting  rule (the thin line)  and the simple majority rule (the
thicker line) for n = 19. Solid lines  depict  the case when  Committee members
vote  individually,  whereas dotted lines correspond  to the case when  the Board
interacts a priori.
Figure 16: Expected probability that the Committee wil1  change interest rata
if Q = 0.25
W.fhere  f(z) = 131 denotes  the ceiling  function,  i.e. the smallest  integer greater  than or
equal  to  2.
?‘The  variation  in the optimal decirive  quota L*  decreases  with the size  of the Committee:
C*  E  (0.35,0.65)  if n = 9, whereas  L-  E  (0.45,0.55)  for  n = 29.
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JFigure 17: Expected probability that the Committee wil1  change interest rates
if Q = 0.75
We conclude  that, although simple majority in general does not constitute
the optimal voting rule,  in practice the fermer  seems  to perform reasonably
well.  There  are two  reasons  for sucb  a claim. First of all, it is wel1  defined for
values  of Q  close to 0.5. Furthermore,  the convergente of the probability that
the Committee  takes a certain decision to the prior probability Q is by no  means
warse  under the simple majority in comparison to the optimal voting rule.
6 Conclusions
Our results  have some intcresting  implications for actual monetary policy mak-
ing, when  conducted in a committce.  First of all, although decision-making  by
a committee is often associated  with inertia, oor  analysis  shows that this is by
no  means necessary.  In fact, the size  of the committee is far less  important
than the skills  of its members in determining inertia (under a simple majority
voting rule). Indeed, larger committees  may be beneficial,  in that the accuracy
of monetary policy decisions  (measured  as  the convergente of the probability of
the actual  interest rate decision to the theoretical beat decision) is increasing
in the committee size.  Second,  oux finding  that the skills of committee mem-
bers are crucial  in determining the quality of monetary policy decision making
stresses  the importante  of professional reputation in monetary policy matters
as  selection criterion for committee membership. Given  the political  dimension
that often surrounds  appointments to monetary policy committeer,  this point is
worth emphssizing.  Third, decisional  skills of committee members arc defined
as  the ability to  identify  correctly the monetary policy stance that is appropri-
ate given  the prevailing  economie  situation.  This definition illustrates  that the
quality of the staf?  supporting each committee member,  and of the information
they base  their advice  on, wil1  be instrumental in ensuring  high skills  of al1 in-
dividual committee members, both from the hub and from the spokes.  Fourth,
under a simple majority voting rule, equal leve1 of skills  between the hub and
the spokes  ensures  that prior interaction of the hub does not materially  Act
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the interest rate setting in the committee. Conversely,  when  the committee
decides  on interest rates by consensus, prior interaction of the hub wil1  affect
the outcome, even if skills are equal.  Finally, the US FOMC and the ECB Gov-
erning Council differ regarding in the degree of centralization: in the FOMC,
the hub bas  the majority in the committee, in the ECB Governing  Council the
committee majority lies with the spokes.  Our results show that a large  hub
affects the outcome of the simple-majority voting only if it bas  superior skills.
Especially if hub members are highly skilled,  their dominante is beneficial for
the accuracy of the decision making process.  Conversely, were committee’s de-
cisions driven  by consensus, hub’s domination would have the largest  impact in
terms  of reducing interest rates inertia if the skills were comparable among al1
committee memben.  In a large  committee, dominated by spoken,  neither the
poasibility  of interaction nor the skills of hub members have a significant effect
on the decision process. Admitting prior interaction under the unanimity rule
reduces the committee’s tendency  towards  inertia only if hub members have
excellent decisional ski&.
We would like to conclude  by stating that, while  the main motivation of this
research is based  on real life,  i.e. the hub-and-spokes  monetary  policy commit-
tees  of the US Federal Reserve and the ECB, our  analysis  is highly styliied and
contains some important caveats. This should  be kept in mind when  interpret-
ing OUT  results. A prime example of such  a caveat is that in our  set-up there is no
interaction among members, and there is no  exchange of arguments that would
lead to a change of position. This aasumption is unrealistic  as it is recognized
(sec,  for example,  DNB (2000) and Goodfriend (1999)) that this  interaction,
where a common vision  on interest rates  evolves  from an exchange of views
based on economie  analysis,  is an important characteristic of monetary  policy
decision making by real-life committees  such  as the ECB Goveming Council or
the FOMC of the Federal Reserve. Introducing some farm  of communication  be-
tween  committee members in OUI  set-up involves  imposing correlation between
their vetes.  In this case, it can be shown  (see Nitzan  and Paroush (1985)) that,
if the exchange of arguments leads  an individual to fellow  the majority view,  the
quality of collective  decision-making  procesa  is adversely  a&cted.  Other studies
that allow  for interaction among committee members (for example Swank  and
Wrssai  (ZOOZ)),  however,  find that a debate in the committee can be beneficial.
We therefore conclude that further  research is warranted on this topic. Other
important caveats  include the static nature of OUI  analysis,  which clearly  is at
odds with the fact  that monetary policy decisions  are taken on a regular basis,
so  that the intertemporal  dimension  may be relevant for the current setting of
interest rates. We plan to take up the latter  issue in future research.
7 Appendix
Here we aim to motivate the assumed behavior  of the Board as stated in section
2.1.
As Kenneth Arrow  bas  proved  in 1952, there is no  consistent method of
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making  a fair choice  among  three  alternatives (decision A, decision B or no
decision). In ether words,  there  is no  consistent rule,  majority voting  or other-
wise,  for constructing  social  preferences  from  arbitrary  individual preferences.”
Therefore thee  does not exist  an  optimal  decision rule  for the choice between
more than  two  alternatives.
Nevertheless,  we can  stil1 compare  different decision rules  in terms  of their
accuracy,  Let U S  do so  for the Board’6  decision rule  that we have suggested  in
section  2.1 (formalized  in quations  (l)-(3))  with  the ordinary  simple majority,
which should be expressed  as fellows  (in analogy  to expressions  (7) and  (S))?
P(C(B)) = Qag8  (s)(l  -q)8qm-L  + (1 - (?)#gn  (:)9’(1-  d?6)
F(C(A))  = 1  -P(C(B)) (29)
F(I)  = 0 (30)
Our  criterion is the degree  of accuracy  in the decisions of the whole  Commit-
tee. Therefore we wil1  be in favor  of the rule  which yields higher  value  for the
following  sum  of conditionsl  probabilities:
Il = P(decision AIA) + P(decision BIB) (31)
Let U S  proceed  in two  cases: the case  when  the Board bas  the majority in the
Committee  and the case when  it does nat.
7 . 1 Case 1: The Board dominates (i.e. m 2 “2)
In this case the Committee’s  decisions are  driven  by the Board. Therefore the
criterion function for the simple majority decision rule  is given  as fellows?
n(SM)  = ’ - s=$+l  ($1 - ‘dEQm- + sz$+l  (;)(l - q)m-Sqs (32)
whereas  for our  decision rule,  the ‘modified  majority’, it is:
n(MM)  = 1  - P(W)
( (
az$ (‘s”)(l  -qPF) + P,,(B),.))
+P(W) (.$ (:)qsWdn-s) +P(C(B),B) (33)
In figure  IA we present the values  of the criterion function Il for  the simple
majority rule  (the thicker line)  and  oux  decision rule  (thinner lines)  for n = 9,
m = 6 and  !q = {4,5,6).
ZZThis  is the fameus  Arrow’s  Imposibility  Thearem.
23For  the  sake  of simplicity  we  assume  identical  decisional  skills  for  all  Committee  members.
4.
24Assuming  m is even
2 1
:
Figure 1A:
0 0.1 0.1 q 0.6 0.8 I
The criterion timction  II = P(decision  AIA) + P(dt xision B(B)
It is clean  that our  decision rule yields  superior  results  for high decisional
skills  (q  > 0.5) for al1 the threshold levels  ks. Let US  now  turn to a more
complicated case of a large  Committee.
7 . 2 Case 2: The Board is in minority (i.e. m < 2)
In this case the position of the non-Board memben  matters  for the final  decision.
The criterion function for the simple majority decision rule  is given  as:
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whereas for the decision rule we suggest  it is:
In @ure 2A we again  present the criterion function. We chose  for R = 29.
1
Figure 2A: The criterion function Il = P(decision  AIA) + P(decision  BIB)
Although the differente is much smaller now,  our decision rule  stil1  performs
bette  than the ordinary simple majority (for q 2 0.5).
We therefore claim, that the Board should  be in favor of the decision ruk
we suggest  versus ordinary simple majority.
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